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The expression ‘Babylonian mode of thought’ has been used in economics – and 
particularly in connection with Post Keynesian economics – in an attempt to identify a 
way of approaching economic analysis which is quite different from the mainstream. 
We start by tracing the use made of the term, and then discuss in more detail its 
meaning and significance. 
But first we need to consider the term ‘mode of thought’. It refers to the principles of 
knowledge construction and communication which underpin choice of methodology, 
and indeed daily life: ‘As we think, we live’ (Whitehead, 1938: 87). A mode of 
thought is ‘the way in which arguments (or theories) are constructed and presented, 
how we attempt to convince others of the validity or truth of our arguments’ (Dow, 
1985: 11). It is important to dig down to this level, beyond the methodological level, 
since arguments about the relative merits of different methodologies (such as Post 
Keynesian and mainstream) can founder through lack of recognition that different 
modes of thought are also involved.  
The term ‘Babylonian’ was used by Keynes (1933/1972) in his biography of Newton, 
where he challenged the conventional understanding of Newton as the first of the age 
of reason. Instead ‘[h]e was the last of the magicians, the last of the Babylonians and 
Sumerians, the last great mind which looked out on the visible and intellectual world 
with the same eyes as those who began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less 
than 10,000 years ago’ (Keynes, 1972: 364). Keynes contrasted the way in which 
Newton relied on intuition in order to arrive at explanations for natural phenomena, 
on the one hand, with the rational proofs he constructed after the fact, on the other.  
The term ‘Babylonian’ then apparently fell into misuse until introduced to modern 
economics in Stohs’s (1983) note on the subject of Keynes on uncertainty, which he 
argued could be developed further on Babylonian lines. He had picked up the 
Babylonian category from Wimsatt’s (1981) discussion in terms of the social sciences 
in general, in juxtaposition to Cartesian/Euclidean thought. According to the 
Babylonian approach, ‘there is no single logical chain from axioms to theorems; but 
there are several parallel, intertwined, and mutually reinforcing sets of chains, such 
that no particular axiom is logically basic’ (Stohs, 1983: 87). 
Wimsatt in turn had developed the idea from Feynman’s (1965) representation of 
what he called the Babylonian tradition in mathematics, which involved a range of 
starting-points for arguments, and thus a multiple derivability of physical laws. 
Feynman contrasted this with the Euclidean approach, which ties all arguments 
deductively to a set of axioms, and argued that the Babylonian approach was 
preferable for physics: ‘The method of always starting from the axioms is not very 
efficient in obtaining theorems’ (Feynman, 1965: 47). Indeed the context of this 
argument is a discussion of the limitations of mathematics for physics (Feynman, 
1965: 56-70). 
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Following on from Stohs, Dow (1985; 1996) explored the nature and implications of 
Babylonian thought in order to understand the different underpinnings of mainstream 
economic methodology from those of the methodologies of other schools of thought. 
Post Keynesianism being one of those schools of thought, the idea of Babylonian 
thought came to be one of the ways by which Post Keynesianism has become 
identified in the various efforts to specify the philosophical and methodological 
underpinnings of Post Keynesian economics. 
Feynman (1965) presented Babylonian mathematics as consisting of an array of 
chains of reasoning, not tied to any one set of axioms, but governed by the 
practicalities of the problem at hand. It is thus a realist approach to knowledge. Since 
no one set of axioms can be relied on as being true, long chains of reasoning simply 
serve to compound any inaccuracy. Rather than constructing a single general formal 
system, it is seen as preferable to segment reality for the purposes of constructing a 
range of partial analyses, which are incommensurate; if they were commensurate, the 
arguments could be formally combined. One chain of reasoning might focus on one 
segment of reality such that a particular variable is (provisionally) exogenous, which 
is endogenous to another chain of reasoning. One chain of reasoning might rely on 
statistical analysis, while another might rely on historical research, for example. 
Euclidean mathematics, by contrast, is a closed logical system built on one set of 
axioms using one, mathematical, method; it abstracts from practical problems in order 
to generate universal solutions within the domain of abstraction. The logical system is 
thus governed by internal rules rather than reference to reality. This deductivist style 
of reasoning is also associated with Descartes, hence the term ‘Cartesian/Euclidean’.  
Cartesian/Euclidean thought is a closed system, such that all variables are pre-
specified and categorised as endogenous or exogenous; what is not known is assumed 
to be random. The nature of the components and their interrelations is fixed. In order 
to satisfy these conditions for closure, Cartesian/Euclidean thought is characterised by 
dualism and atomism. Duals are the all-encompassing, mutually-exclusive categories 
with fixed meaning typical of closed systems. Variables are endogenous or 
exogenous; values are known with certainty (or within a stochastic distribution whose 
moments are known with certainty) or are not known at all; relationships are either 
causal or random; economic agents are rational or irrational, and so on. Atomism 
involves building up a theoretical system on the basis of the smallest units, which are 
independent of each other and of the system of which they are a part – rational 
economic men.  
Babylonian thought is an open system, where the identity of all the relevant variables 
and relationships between them is not known, and in any case the meaning of 
variables and their interrelations is subject to change. There is scope for creativity and 
discrete shifts, as well as for stability.  Babylonian thought is neither dualistic nor 
atomistic. The categories used to account for social life in an evolving environment 
are not seen as readily falling into duals. Indeed vagueness of categories is seen to 
have the benefit of adaptability within a changing environment where institutions, 
understanding and behaviour undergo change. In a system of thought with a variety of 
incommensurate strands of argument, variables may be exogenous to one strand but 
endogenous to another. Knowledge is in general held with uncertainty (by economic 
agents and by economists), so the analysis points to degrees of uncertainty. Further, 
some strands of argument may refer to individuals, and others to the group level, since 
causal forces may act in either direction. Indeed individuals are not seen as 
independent, and their behaviour may change as the environment changes. Institutions 
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and conventions provide the stability to allow decisions to be taken in an uncertain 
environment.  
Babylonian thought therefore refers to a social structure which is understood to be 
organic, itself an open system. It is thus realist, and indeed holds much in common 
with the critical realist approach to economics (although not its philosophical 
foundations). While Lawson (1994) argues that critical realism does not in itself 
provide the basis for identifying schools of thought among those who adopt a critical 
realist approach, this need not be the case (see Dow, 1999). The Babylonian approach 
suggests a basis for differentiation in the form of realist ontology adopted – whether 
the economist understands the economic process in terms of production or exchange, 
class or the rational individual, and so on. The case for the compatibility between 
Babylonian thought and critical realism was made by Arestis, Dunn and Sawyer 
(1999) in response to Walters and Young’s (1997) critique; see also Dow (1999). 
Similarly, Babylonian thought provides a rationale for pluralism. It justifies both 
methodological pluralism (methodologists analysing a range of methodologies) and 
pluralism of method (economists using a range of methods). If the real world is 
understood as organic, not governed by universal laws, then there is scope for a range 
of methodologies. Further Babylonian thought specifically supports the use of a range 
of different methods for different chains of reasoning. But, to be operational, both 
forms of pluralism are moderated by the way in which the open system of thought is 
specified. How the real world is understood will govern the particular choice of 
methodology, and in turn the range of methods to be used.  
The original expression of the Babylonian mode of thought was misunderstood by 
some as the dual of Cartesian/Euclidean thought. Rather than generating a unified 
methodology, it was seen as encouraging methodological diversity in the extreme 
sense of eclecticism. Cartesian/Euclidean thought offers a closed axiomatic system, 
which yields certain conclusions given the axioms. When Babylonian thought was 
understood as an open system without axioms, with incommensurate methods and 
with uncertain conclusions, it was taken to imply the absence of methodological 
principles - an ‘anything goes’ approach. It was associated with pure pluralism in the 
sense of a range of methods with no appraisal criteria by which to assess them. This 
interpretation was restated forcibly by Davidson (2003-04), who insisted on the merits 
of expressing Post Keynesian ontology in terms of axioms. But while axioms imply 
deductive logic, Davidson like most Post Keynesians uses human logic, which is 
implicit in Babylonian thought (see Dow 2005).  
The ‘anything goes’ interpretation is dualistic, according more with the 
Cartesian/Euclidean mode of thought. Rather, the Babylonian mode of thought 
requires some criteria by which to choose segmentations of the subject matter for 
analysis, the chains of reasoning to pursue, and the methods employed to pursue them. 
This means that pluralism in Babylonian thought is not ‘pure pluralism’, but rather 
structured (Dow 2004). The subject matter is regarded as too complex to be captured 
fully in any one analytical system, so a range of choices as to methodology is 
possible. Since Post Keynesians have a distinctive ontology, a distinctive 
methodology follows, which differs from the methodology of other schools of thought 
that also employ an open-systems mode of thought. The corollary is that, while Post 
Keynesians can (and do) argue for their own methodology and theories, they 
recognise that others, with different ontologies, will choose different methodologies 
and theories. While thought progresses within Post Keynesianism, there is also 
evidence in the extent of Post Keynesian work which crosses boundaries with other 
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schools of thought, that an open thought system fosters creative synthetic 
developments. 
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